

REVAMPING THE WORLD GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

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The second half of the 20th century witnessed dramatic changes in the system of international relations, together with the traditional views of the basic principles governing its organization. The largest armed conflict in the history of mankind – World War II – resulted in a standoff between Communism and the free world that was based on the balance of forces. Yet, this bipolar system also produced a balance of weaknesses as the confronting parties habitually closed their eyes to the deficiencies, and even the vices, of their fellow allies.

By confronting each other, and competing with traditional imperialist nations, the United States and the Soviet Union promoted decolonization, thereby extending the sovereignty principle to the world's periphery, while emasculating its essence and importance. During the formation of the bipolar world (1947-1962), the 50 independent states that had existed by the end of WWII were joined by another 100 "sovereign" states, most of which had little grounds for forwarding such a claim. However, the principle of 'political correctness' proclaimed in the postwar years, which postulated a "nation's right to self-determination, up to the separation and establishment of a nation-state" and the "inviolability of state sovereignty," prevented a realistic assessment of the position of the Third World countries which had surfaced almost imperceptibly with the first and second world countries.

Naturally, the principle that had become a very real weapon in the struggle of the superpowers was not waived once one of them was declared victorious in the Cold War. Thus, during the destruction of the bipolar system (1989-1998), the international community was joined by several dozen sovereign states whose viability has yet to be truly tested. At the same time, the United States, which emerged victorious in the Cold War as the main advocate of freedom, democracy and human rights, introduced into world politics new politically correct postulates which proclaimed democracy as a "panacea for all social and economic problems" and which called for the "democratization of the world order."

However, at the turn of the 21st century, it has become obvious that the principles which dominated in the bipolar world cannot be combined with axioms adopted later. The sovereignty of individual states is incompatible with international democracy which presupposes the subordination, in one way or another, of the minority to the majority. The human rights doctrine implies the loss of internal and external legitimacy of those governments which choose to violate these rights. The deficit of democracy inside individual countries, together with their inability to guarantee their social and economic development, calls into question the ability of such nations to implement their sovereign rights.

Many political scientists and policymakers have recently reached the conclusion that failing and failed states make up the bulk of the third world, as well as a large part of the former second world, and that these countries are unable to develop independently. Moreover, they pose a serious threat to international stability. The drama of the situation is enhanced by the following two important circumstances.

On the one hand, the former concept of 'integral sovereignty' is gradually giving way to a system of 'limited sovereignty,' based on the delegation of some powers and functions to supranational bodies. The European Union offers a graphic example of this phenomenon. On the other hand, the United Nations, which continues to be the most authoritative international institution, is subjected to a strong influence from failing and failed states which hold a majority stake in the global body. Therefore, in the 21st-century world, renouncing the traditional sovereignty concept introduced by the Treaty of Westphalia seems to be inevitable. This imperative will be promoted by

the voluntary partial yielding of sovereignty in the developed world and the latter's unreadiness to continue to recognize in full the sovereignty of the failing or failed states. In our view, this process will determine what shape the international community will take in the next few decades.

Yet, while attempting to discern the contours of this new world, it is important not to ignore the main traits of the contemporary reality.

Divided Civilization

The frontier between that part of the world which gravitates toward pooling of the nations' sovereignty together, and that part of the world which places emphasis on its re-establishment, is at the same time the frontier between the communities of successful and failed states. This frontier, now discernible on all continents, is becoming an increasingly insurmountable obstacle. It has been described as a dividing line between the 'core' and the 'periphery,' between the North and the South, between the world of order and the world of chaos, between the post-modern and modern (we would even say 'pre-modern') worlds. Regardless of how we wish to portray the situation, we must admit that this division within contemporary civilization is becoming the determining factor of our times. All of the territories not included in the extended West, with rare exception, comprise the communities of countries which now give rise to a majority of our global problems – political, social, economic and even environmental.

This circumstance makes many of our contemporaries nonplussed. For those whose global outlook was formed in the 1960s-1970s, and nurtured on the ideas of equality and progress, it is impossible to imagine the failure of the 'development concept,' which promised fast economic growth and political stability for the newly independent states. The failures of the developing countries have encouraged the emergence of various theories suggesting that the former metropolitan countries are to "blame" for the present state of the peripheral countries, as well as the concept of "debt for the colonial policy." The proponents of latter concept believe that the backwardness of the least developed nations can and must be overcome through the infusion of generous foreign aid.

Such approaches should be done away with. In many cases (with some exceptions, though) European colonization was a factor of major economic and social progress, which is inconceivable in the conceptual framework of political correctness. The European colonial presence in Africa and Asia, despite many of the obvious pitfalls, helped introduce the local population to new technologies and methods for the organization of labor. Furthermore, it helped raise their level of education, while exposing them to European values. In countries where the colonization period has had a lengthy duration, and where the pre-colonial level of civilization had already been relatively high, the consequences of colonization turned out to be rather positive (India and Malaysia serve as good examples). However, where the colonization process was too brief to bring positive and long-lasting effect, the more primitive cultures were largely destroyed, while the European civilization failed to take root (as occurred in a majority of countries in tropical Africa, for example). In such a situation, the negative consequences of the colonial presence came to the fore: hostility toward the colonizers and the impoverishment of local cultural traditions resulted in efforts to create a new (pseudo) national identity – degrading, showoffish and, in a majority of countries, based on dictatorial rule.

Over the last few decades, there have been plenty examples of "developing" countries rejecting Western values and the Western way of life, and thereby becoming isolated in their backwardness. There are many such countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, as well as in the former Soviet Union where Central Asian republics continued to exist for many decades from resources, technologies and intellectual capital which arrived from Russia. Today, most of these countries have become raw-material economies, coupled with semi-feudal political systems.

There are several reasons which make the independent development of failing and failed states impossible. These are a low potential of human capital; the authoritarian rulers; serious devaluation of natural resources, instigated by the globalization processes. These steadily eroding conditions are occurring at a time when much emphasis is being placed on high technologies and knowledge. Moreover, the humanitarian aid being provided by the Western countries tends to corrupt the population and governments of the failing and failed states. Despite popular opinion,

financial aid packages do not encourage the modernization of the target economies, while giving rise to parasitic attitudes and overt corruption. Furthermore, granting these beleaguered countries a more favorable regime in trade often has a similar effect, since raw materials make up the bulk of their exports. It should not be forgotten that no raw-material economy has been successful in restructuring itself through the good fortune of high resource prices on the global markets. (The Russian people, for example, understand firsthand how dangerous it is to be on the receiving end of generous humanitarian aid, while struggling with an oil addiction to boot).

The experience of the handful of new industrial states that have managed to escape the trap of economic degradation shows that the only way to economic success is to adopt the new rules of the game, established by globalization, and integrate into the community of nations which share the ideas and values of the contemporary winning civilizations in its Western or Asian varieties. These new industrial states are establishing partnership relations with the Western nations. Today, the core states must go to great lengths to promote the successful development of this part of the periphery. However, this assistance should not be in the form of demoralizing aid packages, rather, it should transpire through the opening of markets, the development of human capital, while, at the same time, integrating these countries into the political and economic structures of the core nations.

However, the periphery states' joining the core states does not change the overall situation, especially in those regions where there have been no precedents of successful development, for example, in Africa and the Broader Middle East. It is in these regions where a culture of insurmountable backwardness is manifest by the stagnation, and even degradation, of human capital. The ruling elites of these particular states are always ready to point to other reasons for their countries' problems, but never their own incompetence, self-interest and corruptness. Furthermore, these regions and countries are a major source of environmental problems, while their backwardness aggravates global inequality. Violence in these regions has resulted in millions of refugees and migrants fleeing for safety to other lands, while the disoriented population becomes fertile breeding ground for extremist and terrorist ideas and groups.

Establishing effective control over the on-going processes in these sensitive parts of the world would help consolidate political stability while modernizing those backward countries and regions. It will also help reduce global tensions, fill the 'security vacuum,' and implement the long-awaited reform of the system of international relations, all of which has survived since the Cold War.

Ineffective Institutions

The post-war complicated historical changes have predetermined the unstructured nature of the contemporary system of international relations. This vagueness in international affairs was largely a result of the following circumstances: the prolonged subordination of all political processes to the reality of the Cold War, the increased influence of economic factors on global politics, and reduced possibilities of the use of traditional military force to solve conflicts. These circumstances were not given due consideration, nor were embodied in the present system of international institutions.

The first circumstance was best reflected in the evolution of the United Nations role and importance. Set up in 1945 by 50 countries, the UN did not foresee that dozens of newly independent countries would be applying for membership into the global body over the next few decades. The UN Security Council (the 1945 vintage) was chaired by two superpowers (the Soviet Union and the United States), two colonial powers (Great Britain and France), and China (where the Communists soon rose to power). All of those permanent members enjoyed veto powers, and this arrangement actually served as an instrument for legitimizing the bipolar system. The UN, which existed as something of a supplement to this power structure, was unable to create a collective security system. The UN was helpless to form an effective international armed force that was capable of "keeping" and "imposing" peace, preventing conflicts, and fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Throughout the Security Council's history, actions against aggressor states have been translated into life on only three occasions: in Korea in 1953, in Congo in the early 1960s, and in Kuwait in 1990.

Over the years, the UN has incorporated numerous organizations and agencies, such as the World Health Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Bank, and others. Of course, these organizations are very useful, but it seems that many of the UN bodies have become overbureaucratized or ineffectual talking shops like, for example, the regular UN General Assembly Special Session on Narcotic Drugs. Moreover, the UN agencies, which were established in 1945 but which, as it later turned out, failed to take into account individual states' right to sovereignty, proved to be ineffective (for example, the Military Staff Committee) or were disbanded (the Trusteeship Council, abolished in 1994) altogether. The United Nations, in its present form, has preserved its importance as a unique and universal instrument of dialog, but in practice it lacks the ability to intervene in international conflicts. Oftentimes it even impedes the formation of institutions which are capable of effectively solving problems when and where they arise. The UN has reached the point where its basic structure does not require merely cosmetic repair, but rather a major overhaul.

Another major factor, which has contributed to the confusion in international relations, has been brought about by the growing globalization of the world economy, which has added a political dimension to what seems to be purely economic problems. Many political institutions were established under conditions when it was impossible to foresee oil-pricing controls from international cartels, for example, the bankruptcy of sovereign borrowers, the creation of free trade regions, or the establishment of common currency zones comprising several national economies. Now these political institutions find themselves challenged to effectively perform their functions. The overcoming of economic crises and financial cataclysms usually requires that national sovereignty is temporarily – and, possibly, for an extended duration – limited. However, this requirement is not recognized by the present theory of international relations.

The European Union offers the most graphic example of globalization transforming into political integration. The success of the relatively modest project of integrating the coal and steel industries of France and Germany resulted in the establishment of the European Economic Community. Eventually, following a gradual succession of enlargement waves, there has emerged the European Union – the most complex polity in history. This unique political and economic entity proves not only the economic effectiveness, but also social wholesomeness, of the integration which helps create and maintain a competitive society with a relatively high level of social justice. At the same time, the United Europe restricts (on a voluntary basis) the sovereignty of its neighbors by including them in its frameworks and thereby providing a new model of an expansionist policy – perhaps, the most effective one of all known in history.

Even NATO, the world's mightiest military-political alliance, finds itself in a state of disorientation. For 40 years, the Western bloc ensured strategic deterrence in Europe, yet it proved to be an ineffective tool when it came to punishing the aggressors who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, and then again Spain two and a half years later. In the last decade, the alliance has incorporated over ten new members, yet it has never revised the core elements of its strategy. NATO was split *de facto* on its attitude to the military operation in Iraq, and is presently more than cautious about proposals for expanding its "zone of responsibility."

To sum up, the contemporary world is divided into the same core and periphery zones in politics and the military, just as it is within the economic and social realms. The main distinction, however, is that the U.S. (on the part of the developed world) and Russia and China (on the part of developing countries) remain loyal to the traditional balance of forces policy, while the European states are devoted to the methods of economic pressure, military non-interference and political neutrality. The difference between what is increasingly being described as modern and post-modern politics is becoming ever more distinct. However, neither model proposes a serious alternative for overcoming the global disorder.

Possible Developments

Amidst the growing unpredictability of the global processes, the aggravation of problems now facing mankind, and the emergence of new ones, no member state of the global community can provide for its own internal security. Should a particular region become a hotspot of destructive conflicts, this

development will inevitably have a negative effect on other countries and regions, including the more developed ones. This is why it is vital to assess the possible ways that the world's political architecture may develop, and determine which scenario is the most acceptable (or, at least, the least catastrophic). In so doing, it is important to keep in mind that these are analytical schemes which reflect not so much the real developmental tendencies in the contemporary world as our views of them.

The existing hypotheses concerning the possible evolution of the world order may be divided into three major groups.

The *first* group unites concepts, where there is a strong tendency to view the world in the customary categories of "centers of power" or "poles." These concepts differ from each other considerably, and sometimes even radically.

The end of the Cold War was marked by the spread (especially in the U.S.) of the *unipolar* world concept, de facto administered by the United States. Within the frameworks of this approach, the U.S. began to gravitate more and more toward a strategy of unilateral actions, and U.S. policymakers and experts began to laud the might and greatness of the American Empire. Their opponents, who criticized this concept, warned about an inevitable overstrain upon the abilities of the only superpower, and about the inadmissibility of the concept for a majority within the international community which would inevitably seek to consolidate its numbers in order to counter the global hegemon.

Of more importance, however, are not the consequences that such an approach may have, but the fact that this approach is based on dubious prerequisites and self-delusion. Today's America is the mightiest economic power, but its relative might is much inferior to the American powerhouse of the late 1940s and early 1950s, as well as the early 1920s. U.S. military might, which seems to be unprecedented, turns out to be very limited when Washington makes any attempts to establish stability in hostile regions. Moreover, its political influence, for all of its merits, is not effective enough to relieve the most dangerous processes now taking place in the world. Lest we forget, there was a failure to prevent arch-enemies India and Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons; there was a failure to stop the trade of the advanced technologies necessary for building weapons of mass destruction; there was, and continues to be, a failure to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The opponents of American hegemony argue for a *multipolar* world, but this alternative to Washington's unipolar position strikes as unrealistic and outdated, as the contemporary world cannot be reduced to a combination of mutually counterbalancing centers of force. Like the concept of restoring a counterbalance to U.S. power, this idea is not aimed at addressing new global problems; semantically, it is aimed at rivalry in international relations, rather than cooperation. Its most consistent advocates today are China and France. Russia is vulnerable to the influence of these states and is wavering in determining its own policy, quite often as a result of its irritation with Washington's arrogance.

Lately, however, the Russian leadership has been avoiding any associations with the concept of multipolarity, preferring to describe its policy as 'multivectoral' and void of any definite political (especially anti-American) tint. This new trend is discernible in the statements of President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Their new approach reveals a pragmatic policy of constant maneuvering, which is inevitable in the fast-changing world where standing alliances and orientations are impossible – and moreover, undesirable. This is especially true for a country like Russia, a temporarily weak state which is stuck in the middle of two great divides separating the wealthy and poor countries, and the once-mighty Islamic civilization but now in a state of decay, and the more successful civilizations that have better adapted to the challenges of the new world. Yet, the 'multivectoral' policy is not so much a concept for meeting the challenges of the new world order, as it is a method for not having to make a choice.

The above approaches for organizing international relations, however different they may seem, are based on the concept of positioning one or several countries in opposition to others. However, this is an ideology that has become obsolete and unpromising.

The *second* group of approaches relies upon a paradigm of global governance, with special emphasis on the word 'governance.' The proponents of this model suggest revising the balance-of-forces concept. This particular ideology is reflected most often in the idea of a world government.

However, this grandiose vision has been losing popularity as the number of failing and failed states continues to increase, the role of the UN steadily diminishes, and as proponents of the ‘Washington Consensus’ fail to build a system of effective supranational governance for international economic processes. Finally, the idea is obstructed by nationalistic and separatist trends that have been spreading around the world.

The only real exception to this rule, and it is an important one, is the development and enlargement of the European Union. Despite the irritation that EU bureaucracy very often creates, not to mention its disproportionate level of influence and overall economic and social potential, the United Europe has been the only successful “pilot project” for world government to date. This ongoing process of integration has launched the European countries into a post-modern period, while the rest of mankind remains stuck in modernity. Hopefully, this monumental project will survive and not be washed away in a violent historical maelstrom.

The success of the European experiment has encouraged another concept which resembles a truncated variation of world government, but which actually advocates *fencing off the core from the periphery*. Discouraged by considerations of political correctness, few have dared to formulate this concept publicly. Nevertheless, certain elements of this approach have been surfacing in the policies of the developed countries that continue to speak about aid packages, for example, to the developing nations, while at the same time reducing them. Nations are beginning to withdraw their support from the impoverished and degraded regions of Africa, while ignoring the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even Europe, which remains the largest source of humanitarian aid, has been concentrating more and more on its own problems and the problems of the immediate periphery countries, while reducing its international political activity. This attitude is even more manifest by the developed countries’ policy of escapism toward the Broader Middle East. Problems that have been accumulating there for decades are being ignored in much the same way that the bloody wars in Africa have been ignored.

In general, this concept, which has not been fully formulated, but which has been pursued by default, is based on the opinion that the core states cannot and should not have to bear responsibility for the development of their former colonies some 50 years after they have declared their independence. This formula argues that the core states should only support those countries that have proven their ability to develop, and should interfere in the affairs of the peripheral regions only when developments there threaten to bring about humanitarian catastrophes, or severe global consequences. A policy based on such an approach looks tempting, yet it can hardly be the basis for effective world governance. As follows from past experience, the backward countries are unable to extract themselves from economic stagnation under their own recognizance, thus, they eventually produce problems which inevitably affect the global order – from terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, to the destruction of local ecological systems and the emergence of large-scale epidemics.

Drawing correlation between the probabilities of the first and second scenarios – that is, the formation of a world government and the fencing off of the core from the periphery – brings us to a third paradigm of the global governance, namely, the idea of *neo-imperialism* which appears in two forms – *sporadic* and *collective*.

Sporadic neo-imperialism presupposes that, if some country is unable to ensure the basic rights of its citizens, other countries have the right to impose an ‘external governance’ on it through a mechanism of ‘humanitarian intervention,’ which may result in a partial annexation of its territory, or a full-scale invasion by peacekeeping forces. Examples of such actions were witnessed by NATO’s military involvement in former Yugoslavia; Russia’s actions in Transdniestria, a self-proclaimed republic in Moldova; in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and the use of force by some European countries in their former colonies in Africa. Global developments over the last few decades show that the core countries will have to resort to this instrument of governance more and more often, despite its unattractiveness and the mixed attitudes concerning the final results of such a strategy.

The implementation of this doctrine is impeded by the lack of a mechanism for its legitimization, which sometimes makes it another source of chaos, rivalry and mutual suspicions. That is why, in our view, it must be applied on behalf of the international community – possibly through the restoration of the United Nations trust territories which are administered by the great

powers or their groups under mandates. It also remains unclear whether the ‘neo-imperialists’ – the democratic states – have enough will to translate this policy into life. It may well be that they do not, especially in Europe which has grown weary of wars and colonialism.

Collective neo-imperialism presupposes a new ‘concert of nations’ aimed at achieving goals similar to the ones mentioned above but realized on a larger scale: global domination by the world’s leading powers that will impose their will on the international community; they will counter the growing chaos on the international stage through direct actions, and forward their policies through international organizations. This model seems to represent the most appropriate concept given the present conditions, but it is also the hardest to implement. What is attractive about this hypothetical coalition of powerful states is that it proposes a high level of cooperation among the leading countries in addressing the most difficult problems of the times. These states control the larger part of the world’s gross product, are the major suppliers of high technologies, and would enjoy an overwhelming military superiority over any possible coalition of smaller countries. A strategy that is based on the collective action of the leading nations – which occasionally shows itself behind the concept of the G-8, as well as through some activities of the UN Security Council – would be an impressive breakthrough in international relations. However, the institutional basis for implementing such a paradigm remains undefined.

Finally, there is the *third* group of strategies which we would describe as marginal. Several of them are hopelessly pessimistic, while the others are unfoundedly optimistic.

The pessimistic scenario states that the world is plunging into global disorder and that this trend cannot be resisted. At present, the doctrine which forewarns of the world’s ‘chaotization’ has many supporters, albeit grudgingly, of course. On the contrary, they warn against potential mistakes which could aggravate the slide into chaos. They criticize the United States, the strongest nation in the world, for seriously undermining its status through its invasion of Iraq. By proclaiming its orientation to a unipolar world, and using its military force in an unreasonable and unproductive way, they argue, Washington has undermined its influence and taken a big step toward an ‘apolar,’ chaotic and uncontrolled world. Yet, even in these conditions it would be premature to give up the attempt to form a more predictable and governable world.

The other, optimistic, scenario is popular amongst the American experts and is based on the idea of delivering democracy to an increasing number of countries. According to the adepts of this approach, it will introduce peace and stability, attributes which they believe characterize relations between the democracies. However, this strategy has its own number of faults. On the one hand, this postulate is applicable only to liberal democracies and has no relation to illiberal democracies which emerge as a result of artificial (or forced) democratization. Democracy does not take root in the poor traditionalist societies, thus, imposing democracy in a missionary way is usually counterproductive from the standpoint of the aforementioned objective. At best, such democratization is not neutral in terms of maintaining international peace, while forced democratization (say, in China, Saudi Arabia or Iraq) may have grave consequences in terms of international stability. And, finally, it would be arrant nonsense and irresponsible to propose a greater ‘democratization’ of international relations, since this would only serve to enhance the influence of the failed states on the international stage.

Therefore, of the concepts for maintaining the future world order, it is vital to give preference to those which seek to lay the foundation of a really predictable world – if not governed, then governable; if not managed, then manageable. Thus, with these considerations in mind, the most promising concept for organizing global relations seems to be the model of collective neo-imperialism, which we will elaborate upon below.

Way Out

The authors of this article, despite being in favor of collective neo-imperialism, are open to other doctrines for an optimum world order. Thus, we propose working out a synthetic concept that takes into account the strong points of each of the aforementioned approaches and would be acceptable to a majority of actors in international politics. The main trait of the concept, based on this idea, would be increasing the governability of the international system; preventing the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reducing the risk of their use; combating terrorism; creating favorable conditions for economic and social modernization and, on this basis, democratization of the developing countries; and expanding the space of stability, now limited to the core countries.

The creation of a stable and governable international system would open up prospects for backward countries as well and create prerequisites, at least theoretical ones, for their progress. But if the current trend of sliding into chaos persists, there will simply be no chance for such an alternative.

The reform of the system of global institutions must *begin* with the establishment of new international structures, which would coordinate interaction between the core countries; *continue* with their co-existence and even competition with the now-existing institutions; *develop* with an increase in the number of participants in the new structures; and, finally, *end* with the formation of institutions that would best meet the tasks on the agenda.

At the *first* stage, the developed countries must use their potentialities and resources to transform the core into a union capable of effectively influencing the periphery, making it more governable. At the same time, the core should extend its principles to the periphery. However, there is no well-defined nucleus around which the consolidation could begin. There are three alternative variants for such a nucleus: the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (possibly enlarged), the Group of Eight (also possibly enlarged), and the 25 member states of the European Union. A compromise variant would be the more realistic scenario, which would more likely include the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Russia. China and India – steadily developing countries that are not interested in a destabilization of the international situation – could also be included.

Initially, these countries would have to conclude several agreements among themselves which would determine their common position on various issues, such as social problems and security issues. It would be important for this coalition to declare its resolve at combating the dangerous tendencies now occurring around the world. The new coalition, or alliance, would proclaim its devotion to the ideas incorporated in the UN Charter, and seek to make the UN's actions more effective and resolute.

The *second* stage, which will inevitably be the most difficult one to fulfill, will include a package of measures for reforming the UN. This will vest it with adequate powers, which will include the creation of adequate UN security agencies.

The international community will have to consider a return to the original variant of the UN Charter, which did not provide for nations' right to self-determination. A new UN Charter would specify requirements for UN member states and outline procedures for expelling a country from the UN or suspending its UN membership. If this reform succeeds, the core countries will shoulder the responsibility for organizing united armed forces. These forces would act under the UN aegis but would be controlled by representatives of the great powers. If the reform fails (which seems to be a high probability), the core countries will not be bound to carry out decisions made within the UN framework (which is already adhered to through the veto right); moreover, it may be an occasion to begin the establishment of a collective military and security structure outside the UN. In the latter case, it would be logical to assume that the new structure would be built along the lines of NATO. This would require the disbandment of the Western alliance and the formation of a new military-political organization which is not limited to a "zone of responsibility" (which is long overdue).

The second stage will result in the emergence of a serious political and military coalition of developed countries which share clear-cut principles with regard to how the world will be organized. These principles will be openly declared, and in the case of flagrant violations (for example, the patronage of terrorist organizations, mass violations of human rights, genocide, religious persecution, and an obvious inability of governments to control the situation in their own countries) forceful measures may be initiated. These changes will make the system of international relations more definite and less prone to influence from failing and failed states. Furthermore, those countries not included in the coalition will have no doubts about the limits of their powers with regard to their native population, neighbors and international norms.

At the *third* stage, the institutionalization of the new international structures will enter the concluding phase. The core countries will have a real opportunity for formulating their requirements for other states (naturally, stipulated not by arbitrary interests but by the need to confront dangerous global tendencies) concerning the non-proliferation of WMD, human rights, environmental protection, etc. However, it is contingent on the core countries that they not seek the fulfillment of these requirements by the use of force: the main instrument of pressure on the periphery nations must be favorable terms for their economic, technological and informational partnership with the core countries. The developed countries would resort to the use of military force only in exceptional cases, such as the need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe or stop aggression between the peripheral states. The union of developed countries must strive not for subduing the peripheral territories, but for civilizing them and helping their peoples attain a level of development that will allow them to act as full-fledged sovereign states. For some failing and failed countries, the status of mandated territories administered from the outside should be restored, using legal provisions similar to those formerly included in the UN Charter.

The formation of a stable union of developed countries can play a decisive role in settling many chronic conflicts, above all, the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Its persistence, compounded by the significance of the issue which has accumulated over the last few decades, does not inspire hope that a settlement is possible without interference by a third party. This may require a partial return of the Middle East territories under the trusteeship of the great powers. Collective security agencies must also be established for the Broader Middle East. Here, they could play a positive role similar to that played by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe which was responsible for regulating the conflicts between East and West.

Naturally, the abovementioned stages – first, the fencing off of the core from the periphery, then its self-organization, and finally its active influence – are only theoretical. Some of the problems concerning the failing and failed countries must be addressed immediately. We have only drawn attention to some of the more important priorities, the main one being the self-identification and self-organization of the core states.

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In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that the 21st-century world order will differ from the world order that the 20th-century policymakers knew. The main difference will be the diminished importance of the balance-of-forces principle which has played a major role throughout the last 300 years. The reduced probability of a conflict between the great powers and the convergence of their positions on a majority of disputed international issues could and should result in the formation of an alliance of the developed countries, whose might will not be counterbalanced by any coalition of peripheral states.

This transformation will have far-reaching consequences, as the core countries cease democratizing international relations, as well as recognizing the more harmful views and positions of the failing and failed states. The core countries will no longer be able to close their eyes to human rights violations in the peripheral countries, as well as to problems connected with the proliferation of WMD and the sponsorship of terrorist activities. The coalition of developed countries will be able to establish norms of conduct on the international stage, limit the degree of governments' freedom with regard to their own citizens, and verify the observance of these norms and rules.

Another major difference between the new and old systems of international relations will be the restoration of a system of governance of failing and failed states by individual great powers or their coalition. This governance will be aimed not at exploiting those countries' natural wealth or human resources, but at protecting their citizens' basic rights and guaranteeing their observance. The Westphalian system will become a thing of the past as human rights take priority over the rights of peoples, nations and states.

The feasibility of these forecasts depends on the abilities of the developed countries to coordinate their policies and subordinate their current goals to the task of building a predictable and safe world. We cannot say for sure how resolute the governments of these countries will be in

choosing this path. But we do hope that a perspective vision will prevail over superficial and short-term interests.

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